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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD LEE POTTER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRIORITY 2 
Case # 20030105-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Jury conviction and final Judgement and Commitment in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, Duchesne, County, Roosevelt Division for a jury trial and 
subsequent sentence of imprisonment for five years to life in prison for a conviction of two counts 
of Distribution of a Controlled Substance enhanced for prior conviction of drug crimes, both First 
Degree Felony violations of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8, before the Honorable Judge John R. 
Anderson on January 9, 2003. 
This appeal is filed pursuant to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the conviction pursuant to §58-37-8(2)(a)(i)and Rule 3(a) and Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code 78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Mr. Potter raises one issue for review and argues error based on either plain error and/or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Potter asserts that the Information filed against him set forth 
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that Mr. Potter's crime was distribution of drugs while having a prior conviction. However, no 
evidence was ever presented to the jury about a prior conviction. Therefore the jury was 
improperly put on notice of prior crimes without the state ever having to address proper 
evidentiary rules. Such action prejudiced the jury and resulted in an improper conviction which did 
not conform to the Information or in the alternative convicted him of an enhanced crime without 
the sufficient evidence to do so. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
The trial court's failure to either require an amended Information or to require the 
prosecution to put on sufficient evidence of the prior conviction was Plain Error. 
When a claim such as this is not preserved at the trial court level this Court can only review 
the matter if mistake is one of plain error-meaning it is so obvious that the Court should have 
discovered the problem and moved to address the issue sua sponte. "To succeed on a claim of 
plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing \I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993), See also State v. Helmick. 9 P.3d 164 (Utah 2000). 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel 
fP
 rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment' and that 'counsel's performance prejudiced'" the defendant. State v. Maestas. 984 P.2d 
376 (Utah 1999), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised for the first time on appeal they 
are reviewed as a matter of law. See Maestas, Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutions, statutory provisions, or rules referenced in this brief and 
pertinent to the issues now before the court on appeal are contained herein or attached to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 18, 2002, the Duchesne County Attorney filed a four count indictment against 
Mr. Potter in the Roosevelt Department alleging illegal drug distribution (Record of Trial Court, 1 
& 2). Count One alleged Distribution of a Controlled Substance (Second Degree Felony) and 
Counts Two Three and Four alleged Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone 
while having a prior drug offense conviction making the remaining three counts First Degree 
Felony charges (Rt. 2). 
A Preliminary Hearing was held on May 23, 2002 in which the trial court bound Mr. Potter 
over on all four charges (Rt. 30). 
On July 12 Mr. Potter requested new counsel and the court heard the matter by way of 
motion hearing on July 18, 2002 (Rt. 38 & 42). The motion was denied and trial counsel Karen 
Allen was kept on the case.1 
Karen Allen filed a Motion for a Change of Venue (Rt. 120) which was denied (Rt. 128) 
xMr. Potter originally requested an appeal listing this as a possible issue for appeal. 
However, any claim raised by Mr. Potter about Karen Allen was addressed at the hearing. Issues 
of not meeting with her enough were cured by having him relocated to the County jail close to 
Ms. Allen's office. All pre-trial motions dealing with change of venue, separate trials on the four 
counts and the 120 day detainer issue were filed and addressed by the trial court. No claims or 
evidence appear after the first allegation that any ineffective assistance of counsel claims appear or 
continued other than to the extent they are raised here in order to bring this matter before this 
Court for review. 
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and a Motion to Sever the Counts of the Information for trial (Rt. 131). The Motion to Sever was 
granted and Counts One and Two were ordered to be tried separately (Rt. 134). 
A trial was started on August 27, 2002 and counsel made a Motion for a Mistriahhat was~" 
denied based on a statement made b* a jury panel member before the jury was seated. (Rt. 139). 
The jury was excused and trial was re-scheduled to September 24, 2002 due to remarks made by a 
jailer who was on the jury panel (Rt. 138) however, the court was clear that it did not declare a 
mistrial but merely continued the trial. 
On September 24, 2002 a jury trial proceeded as to Count One and Count Two (Rt. 191) 
and the jury convicted Mr. Potter of both the second and the first degree charges. To date Mr. 
Potter has not claimed any appeal issues as to that trial and does not claim any issues on appeal 
regarding the sentence on the entire case. 
On November 15, 2002 the second trial on Counts Three and Four proceeded (Rt. 254). 
At that time the Court located the copy of the 120 day disposition through the jail and the follow-
up on August 29, 2002 to see why it was not granted as August 30, 2002 would be the 120 day 
mark (Rt. 246). 
The trial court denied the argument made by counsel regarding the 120 day detainer and 
ruled that any delay was proper in that the first delay was the motion to sever and then that the first 
trial had to be continued to prevent any prejudice to the defendant based on the jury panel 
member's remark (Rt. 246). 
The jury convicted Mr. Potter of both Count Three and Count Four (Rt. 246). 
Mr. Potter was sentenced on January 9, 2003 for all four counts he was convicted of and 
the trial court gave him concurrent sentences on all four counts and ran them concurrently with the 
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sentence he was currently serving. (Rt. 277). 
MrTPotter timely appealed the conviction (Rt. 263) and the trial court appointed Julie 
George to pursue the appeal. 
Appeals counsel sought and was granted a continuation for filing the opening brief in this 
case and the brief is due on or before July 27, 2003, with filing on July 28th, the next business day 
of the calendar. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Potter was accused of selling methamphetamine in a drug free zone on September 24 
and September 25 of 2001 (Trial Transcript, Page 69). Two police officers, Brad Draper and 
Wayne Hollobeke met a confidential informant, Susie Springer and she agreed to purchase 
methamphetamine on behalf of the officers in numerous drug sting operations in the tri-city area 
(T. 69). On September 24 Mr. Potter met Springer and got into her vehicle. Springer drove him 
to the post office where she paid him $100 in cash and he gave her a little bag of methamphetamine 
which Springer took back to the officers (T. 69). 
The next day Mr. Potter met with Springer again and $50 in cash was exchanged for drugs. 
The drugs were tested (nine months after the seizure) by the crime lab and were deemed to be 
methamphetamine. The parking lots where the drugs were exchanged are considered drug free 
zones (T. 70). 
The state called as its first witness Brad Draper who testified before the jury that he was 
employed with the Uintah Basin Narcotics Task Force (T. 74). Draper testified that he used 
Springer as a confidential informant and put a body wire on her before the buy. He searched her to 
make sure she had no drugs on her person and then gave her money to go purchase drugs from 
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Mr. Potter (T. 75-80). The police determined at the first transaction that Mr. Potter had more 
drugs to sell if Springer could come up with the money so the police sent her back the next day to 
buy more drugs (T. 81). 
The next day Springer was searched again, her car was searched, she wore a body wire and 
went back to the trailer court where Mr. Potter resided and again picked him up in her car to go to 
a parking lot to exchange the drugs for money (T. 82). 
Draper testified that after the first drug buy he knew Mr. Potter had the ability to sell more 
so he purposely did not arrest him but went back with more money for a second buy with the same 
informant (T. 92). 
Springer testified that she was a single mother of four children and that her main source of 
income during the time she set up Mr. Potter was the money she made in cash from the drug deals 
for the strike force. Springer was paid $50 in cash for each drug deal and she made 150 deals 
approximately that winter (T. 111). Springer only got paid if she actually could show she bought 
the drugs (T. 134). 
At no time was evidence presented to the jury that Mr. Potter had a prior conviction or that 
conviction of one count would constitute a prior drug convictions for enhancement purposes on 
counts three and four. 
After the close of the evidence and during deliberation the Court addressed the 120 
detainer issue raised by Mr. Potter. Mr. Potter filed a 120 detainer on May 1, 2003. The detainer 
was approved and received by the jail as of May 6, 2001 (T. 144). However, the trial in this case 
was not held until after the 120 days had expired. The 120 time period had expired by the first trial 
date in which the trial was continued in August due to the jury panel member's remarks during jury 
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selection (T. 144-145). The delay in the second trial was due to defendant's motion which was 
granted, to sever the counts and try them separately. 
The trial judge determined that good cause was shown for the trial date set outside the 120 
detainer time and therefore the lack of speedy trial was justifiably excused for good cause (T. 
146).2 
After deliberation the jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts (T. 147-148). 
Mr. Potter was sentenced concurrently on all four counts and concurrently to his prior conviction 
and sent to the Utah State Prison for the five to life sentences. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Information in this case charges Mr. Potter with Distribution of Methamphetamine 
after having been convicted of a drug crime in his past (TR. 3-4). However, no where either in 
opening statements, the case in chief, rebuttal or closing arguments does the state ever put on any 
evidence of a prior crime (T. 70-148). However, the jury clearly was put on notice of the prior 
conviction due to the information. By not amending the Information the jury was put on notice 
that Mr. Potter had a prior drug conviction. However, unless the jury is properly presented with 
such information for purposes of enhancement then it would not have been brought to their 
attention at all. Mr. Potter asserts that for the state to properly enhance his sentence for prior 
crimes, the issue of prior crimes has to be addressed by the jury. However, no evidence was 
presented to the jury on the prior crime and therefore no enhancement was proper unless the 
2Mr. Potter initially wrote to counsel and sought to raise as an issue the violation of the 
120 detainer. Although the second trial was outside the 120 days, the first trial was timely. The 
second trial was delayed for good cause reasons set forth in the most recent opinions of this Court 
and therefore that issue has not been briefed Only issues deemed viable under the current case law 
have been raised. 
7 
enhancement was solely based on the drug free zone where the drug buys occurred. If that was the 
case then the Information should have been amended to conform with the evidence presented in 
this case and it was not done. Therefore the Information alleged an enhancement that was never 
presented to the jury in the proper way to enhance the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO THE JURY 
REGARDING THE PRIOR CONVICTION. THEREFORE, EITHER THE CONVICTION 
FAILS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OR IT FAILS BECAUSE THE INFORMATION 
AND JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT THE 
CONVICTION RENDERED BY THE JURY. 
Mr. Potter alleges that it was plain error for the Trial Court to fail to order the State 
correct the "prior conviction" language in the information; or in the alternative to force the state 
to properly present it to the jury for use as an enhancement. As the State did neither; it did not 
amend the Information and it failed to properly present the information of the prior conviction to 
the jury in an effort to properly enhance the conviction under the statute-the jury was left with an 
Information stating that Mr. Potter had a prior drug conviction. Mr. Potter asserts that the trial 
court's failure to correct the error prejudiced him in that the jury was improperly put on notice that 
he had a prior conviction when no evidence of that was necessary due to the drug free 
enhancement being used at trial. 
Furthermore, if this Court determines that the Trial Court did not commit plain error, then 
Mr. Potter asserts that his trial attorney committed ineffective assistance of counsel when she failed 
to raised the issue below. Once it was clear that the prosecution was not going to use the prior 
conviction to enhance the crime, but rather, it intended to use the fact that the drug sales were 
committed in a drug free zone, the court or defense counsel should have insisted that the 
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Information be amended to conform with the evidence. 
Failure to make that request left a result of a jury conviction for a crime that did not match 
the Information and prejudiced the jury in that the jury was put on notice of a prior conviction 
when it was not properly an issue for them to know. 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 404b, a prior conviction can only be used when it is for 
a proper purpose. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In 
other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character 
purpose and meets the requirements of [r]ules 402 and 403. 
Utah R.Evid. 404(b). 
Therefore, prior bad acts testimony is admissible under rule 404(b) "if the evidence is 
relevant to a proper, non-character purpose, unless its danger for unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs its probative value." State v. Bradley, 57 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah App. 
2002), quoting, State v. Widdison. 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2000). 
Here, by not amending the Information the jury was, without the required analysis of the 
trial court, put on notice of Mr. Potter's prior conviction. Such material, of a prior drug dealing 
conviction that is being used to enhance the current drug dealing allegation against Mr. Potter is 
clearly prejudicial. The only way that material would have been more probative than prejudicial is 
if the State had no choice but bring the material before the jury in order to prove their case. They 
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filed the Information alleging that is why the enhanced the charge. However, they never made the 
prior conviction an issue for the jury to determine and instead used the drug free zone as the 
enhancing factor in the case. Knowing that was how they planned to proceed the State should 
have amended the Information to accurately reflect the evidence presented and the conviction 
given. No such Amendment has ever been made. Indeed the Judgement and Conviction which is 
attached clearly shows that the Convictions are for "Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, in a Drug-Free Zone, with a Prior Conviction (Methamphetamine)-a First 
Degree Felony" (See Judgment and Conviction Page 1). 
Mr. Potter asserts that the State cannot have it both ways; they cannot file charges that 
enhance his crime for having prior convictions, put the jury on notice of his prior bad acts 
(conviction) without proper trial court analysis and argue that he was not prejudiced because they 
never put on evidence to that fact at trial. If they failed to put on evidence of that fact at trial (It 
was not brought up anywhere in the evidence) then the State cannot argue that the jury found the 
element of the crime necessary to convict Mr. Potter of the crime. There is clearly insufficient 
evidence to convict Mr. Potter of the enhanced crime if the jury was never provided with any 
evidence of a prior conviction. 
In a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction Mr. Potter would have to argue 
that there was insufficient evidence presented to a jury to support the verdict. 
" This court has stated that in order to prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict, 
"the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict."State v. Hopkins. 989 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1999) (quotation omitted)." As quoted in State v. 
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Prichett 69 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2003). 
Here, Mr. "Potter can marshal all of the evidence by showing that at the preliminary hearing 
(PL, #4), the prosecutor informed the judge that he intended to enhance the conviction by arguing 
that Mr. Potter had previously been convicted of a drug crime by use of the first two counts in the 
Information. At trial, the Information was not amended and clearly indicates that Mr. Potter is 
charged with Distribution of Methamphetamine enhanced due to a prior conviction. However, no 
where in the trial transcript is the jury ever given any evidence of the prior crime. Therefore, the 
jury had absolutely no basis to find Mr. Potter guilty of the enhanced crime if no evidence 
supporting the enhancement was given to the jury. Indeed, the mere allegation that Mr. Potter had 
a prior crime, as set forth in the Information, was sufficient to taint the jury and result in the 
prejudicial outcome of the guilty verdict. Finally, no where in the trial transcript is it set forth that 
the trial judge determined the proper 404b analysis to allow the taint of the prior conviction to get 
to the jury or in the alternative to rule that as a major element of the State's case in chief the proof 
the prior conviction was necessary to prove the crime at issue. 
Utah Code §58-37-8 Provides :(l)(a)...[I]t is unlawful to (ii)distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance...(iii)possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
Section (b) provides that such an act is a Second Degree Felony unless the person has a 
prior conviction for such a crime and then it is enhanced to a First Degree Felony. 
The State will argue that it was the distribution in a Drug Free Zone (parking lot) that 
enhanced the crime pursuant to subsection (4)(viii). However, the Information and Judgement and 
Conviction do not support that Mr. Potter was charged with the Drug Free Zone Enhancement. 
They clearly reflect that he was charged with the prior crime enhancement. 
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The Information and the Judgement and Commitment do not conform with the evidence 
produced at trial. Neither have amended to this date. Furthermore, if Mr. Potter was charged with 
an enhanced crime alleging that he had a prior conviction, the only to properly convict of him that 
crime to produce that evidence to a jury. Mr. Potter argues that the prior crimes enhancement is 
similar to the "gang enhancement" and that to properly convict him of the enhancement the jury 
had to find those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Most recently in State v. Smith, 42 p.3d 1261 (Utah 2002) the Court reiterated the burden 
necessary to prove the gang enhancement providing: 
"[I]n State v. Lopes 980 P.2d 191, (Utah 1999) held that subsection (5)(c) of section 76- 3-203.1 
was unconstitutional See id. at ^ 17. The Court based this holding on its conclusion that 
sentencing enlrancements "create[ ] a specific new crime or a crime of a higher degree[, and a]s 
such, each of the elements [of the enhancement] must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 
T[ 15. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly did not distinguish between sentencing 
enhancements that provide for a mandatory minimum term and sentencing enhancements that 
prescribe a maximum term beyond that otherwise allowed. Instead, the Court held: 
When the legislature passed the gang enhancement provision, ("Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
Q995I which imposes a mandatory minimum term,] it acted just as it did when it passed the 
firearm enhancement provision[, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 19981 which imposes an 
additional, consecutive term]: it mandated imposition of an enhancement only upon proof of 
elements over and above those required for the crime of lesser consequence.... As such, each of the 
elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. Thus, under Lopes, imposition of either type of sentence enhancement requires that the relevant 
facts be found by the trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Mr. Potter argues that if the State wanted to properly convict him of the prior crimes 
enhancement they had to put on evidence to the jury and prove that prior crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. They did not. They did nothing more than charge him with the crime in the 
Information and use that allegation to prejudice the jury. Mr. Potter asserts that if the State did 
not intend to use the prior crime as an enhancement they should have amended the Information and 
made sure no taint of the prior conviction got to the jury. Additionally, the Judgment and 
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Commitment should not have listed as convicted of a crime that was never at issue, i.e., conviction 
Tjrarag aistnoution with a prior crime enhancement. 
When a claim such as this is not preserved at the trial court level this Court can only review 
the matter if mistake is one of plain error-meaning it is so obvious that the Court should have 
discovered the problem and moved to address the issue sua sponte. "To succeed on a claim of 
plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing* (I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993), See also State v. Helmick. 9 P.3d 164 (Utah 2000). 
The error of having the prior conviction listed in the Information but not addressed in 
opening statements was clear. The trial Court was privy to the nature of the case and the issue of 
the prior conviction as it was addressed at the preliminary hearing (PLT. #4). And yet the 
evidence of the prior conviction was never mentioned in the jury instructions. When it was clear to 
the Court that the prior conviction was not going to be necessary element to the trial and the 
government was using the drug free zone as the basis for the enhancement not the prior conviction, 
the trial judge should have requested an Amend Information to conform with the evidence. 
The error was clearly harmful to the defendant in that the jury, with no legitimate basis or 
reason, was told by way of the Information, that Mr. Potter had a prior conviction. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel 
"'rendered deficient performance [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment' and that 'counsel's performance prejudiced1" the defendant. State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 
376 (Utah 1999), citing Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Mr. Potter asserts that in the event that this Court does not find that this issue is properly 
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before the Court on the basis of Plain Error, that it is properly before the Court on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in so far that it is reasonable that his attorney should have made 
sure that the Information conformed with evidence presented to the jury. Failure to do so left the 
jury with the highly prejudicial information that he was convicted of drug distribution in the past. 
Such evidence or inference was improper where the State was not relying on the prior conviction 
but the drug free zone element to enhance the conviction. 
Clearly Mr. Potter was prejudiced by error where the jury, without the benefit of a 404b 
analysis was put on notice of prior distribution conviction. It was clearly not necessary and was 
obviously prejudicial and therefore trial court's's failure to object or cure the defect was ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Potter respectfully requests that this Court overturn his conviction in this case for the 
reasons set forth above and remand the case for a new trial to conform with the Information. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ? 2 day o f c / t / i , 2003. 
JUp£ GEORGE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered or mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief to: 
LAURA DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL APPEALS DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 
DATED THIS DAY OF "3d 2003. 
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ADDENDA A 
CLEVE HATCH #5609 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
DAVID K. CUNNINGHAM #7497 
DEPUTY DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(435)738-0184 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
- - oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, : JUDGMENT AND 
COMMITMENT ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
: Criminal No. 021000156 
RICHARD LEE POTTER, : 
Defendant. : Judge John R. Anderson 
—oooOooo— 
DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) - A SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE, WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION 
(METHAMPHETAMINE) - A FIRST DEGREE FELONY 
DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE, WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION 
(METHAMPHETAMINE) - A FIRST DEGREE FELONY 
DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE, WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION 
(METHAMPHETAMINE) - A FIRST DEGREE FELONY 
The above-entitled case came before the Court for Sentencing on Thursday, January 9, 
2003, the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, presiding. The defendant was present and was 
represented by his attorney, Karen Allen. The State of Utah was represented by Cleve Hatch, 
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Duchesne County Attorney. The Court had received and reviewed the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Statements were made by counsel 
for the parties and the defendant. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
That the defendant has been convicted by a Jury of the offenses of Distribution of or 
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, (Methamphetamine), a Second Degree 
Felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8 UCA (1953) as amended; Distribution of or Arranging 
to Distribute a Controlled Substance, In a Drug-Free Zone, With a Prior Conviction 
(Methamphetamine), a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8 UCA (1953) as 
amended; Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, In a Drug-
Free Zone, With a Prior Conviction (Methamphetamine), a First Degree Felony, in violation 
of Section 58-37-8 UCA (1953) as amended; and Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, In a Drug-Free Zone, With a Prior Conviction (Methamphetamine), 
a First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8 UCA (1953) as amended. 
That for the offense of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance (Methamphetamine), a Second Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the 
defendant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not less than one (1) year nor more than 
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison. That for the offense of Distribution of or Arranging 
to Distribute a Controlled Substance, In a Drug-Free Zone, With a Prior Conviction 
(Methamphetamine), a First Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is 
sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not less than five (5) years and could be for life in 
the Utah State Prison. That for the offense of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance, In a Drug-Free Zone, With a Prior Conviction (Methamphetamine), 
a First Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term of not less than five (5) years and could be for life in the Utah State Prison-
That for the offense of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, In 
a Drug-Free Zone, With a Prior Conviction (Methamphetamine), a First Degree Felony, it 
is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not less than 
five (5) years and could be for life in the Utah State Prison. Said prison sentences shall run 
concurrent with each other, and concurrent to the sentence the defendant is currently serving at 
the Utah State Prison. 
It is further ordered that the defendant pay restitution to the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike 
Force, c/o Vernal City Police Department, 437 East Main Street, Vernal UT 84078, in the sum of 
$490. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample and pay the required fee. 
Commitment shall commence forthwith-
The defendant is remanded to the Duchesne County Sheriff to be transported to the Utah 
State Prison, Thereafter, the defendant is remanded to the custody of the Board of Pardons. 
DATED this JO^ day of January, 2003. 
fOHNR. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
JkLz 
Karen Alien 
Attorney for Defendant 
^BiaiCAIljOFDELr^gY 
l^^^=« A l l ' ' Karen Allen 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 409 
Duchesne UT 84021 
by dent ing » her box at the Duchesne County Justice Center, Duchesne, Utah. 
Legal Assistant 
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KAREN ALLEN #7454 JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
Attorney for the Defendant gy ""I'VL/L.-
P.O.Box409 .DePuT. 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Telephone: (435)738-2432 
In The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah 
Duchesne County - Roosevelt Department 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD LEE POTTER, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Criminal No. 021000156 
Judge John R. Anderson 
COMES NOW the Defendant, RICHARD LEE POTTER, and serves notice of his intent 
to appeal the decision of the above-entitled Court which was settled in its entirety on November 
15, 2002. This hearing concluded the matter wherein the defendant was found guilty to the 
charges of Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug-Free Zone, a First Degree Felony 
and Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony. The Defendant further 
specifies that he appeals from the decision of the Court on the basis that the Court improperly 
admitted matters into evidence which were without foundation, were not the best evidence and 
were immaterial to the issues and further that the. Court did not correctly apply the law to the 
facts presented at trial. 
DATED this 30 day of January, 2003. 
1 
Karen Allen 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Appeal to: 
Cleve Hatch 
Duchesne County Attorney 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Mr. Richard Lee Potter (Inmate) 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
first-class postage prepaid, this 30 day of January, 2003. 
Sa/JL' 7Vl&d~ 
Sandi Mott 
Legal Assistant 
